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I. Introduction  
 
As of February 2017, 15 Pay for Success (PFS) 
contracts using social impact bonds (SIBs) have 
been launched in the U.S.  In combination, these 
projects are scheduled to deliver approximately 
$130 million in services and serve more than 
20,000 individuals. These projects tackle issues 
in homelessness, criminal recidivism, early 
childhood education, maternal and infant 
health, child welfare system reform, and 
substance abuse treatment.  
 
This policy brief discusses the reasons that 
governments around the country are testing the 
Pay for Success approach.  It also explains the 
PFS model, describes PFS projects in the US to 
date, and presents some of the lessons that have 
been learned from the initial U.S. PFS projects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II. The need for a new approach 
 
Each year, governments spend hundreds of 
billions of dollars addressing social problems. In 
most cases, we have no idea how effective this 
spending is. Performance is rarely assessed, and 
measurement tends to focus on tracking the 
quantity of services provided rather than the 
impact of those services on the lives of the 
individuals served.  Once a social program gets 
in a government’s budget, it becomes nearly 
immortal.  It develops a constituency and then 
receives funding year after year, usually without 
any serious attempt to determine how effective 
the program is.  
 
At the same time, tight budgets cause us to 
underinvest in prevention even when we know 
that the underinvestment will lead to greater 
expenditures on remediation down the road. 
Tight budgets can also stifle innovation – how 
can we come up with the resources to test 
promising new ideas when we can’t even afford 
to pay for everything that we are already doing?  
 
More fundamentally, business-as-usual methods 
of contracting for social services are hindering 
our ability to make progress in addressing 
complex social problems. Responsibility for 
solving serious social challenges is often split 
among government agencies, service providers, 
and other community stakeholders, but 
government agencies and providers are unable 
to sustain the long-term data-driven 
collaborations that are necessary to make 
significant progress on these difficult problems.  
Governments know that recidivism, 
homelessness, child maltreatment, substance 
abuse, and many other social problems pose 
serious challenges, yet they fail to manage their 
social service contracts in a purposeful way to 
improve systems and generate better outcomes.   
 
Governments should be systematically 
identifying high-risk populations and referring 
them to the services that best fit their needs. 
Instead, providers are left to identify clients and 
fill slots in their programs in an ad hoc manner, 
allowing needy individuals to fall through the 
cracks and dollars to be allocated inefficiently. 
Governments should also be actively managing 
social service contracts, meeting regularly with 
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service providers to review performance data, 
and collaborating on improving the systems 
through which vulnerable populations are 
connected with needed services.  Instead, most 
governments treat contract management as a 
back office function limited to processing 
invoices and verifying compliance with contract 
terms.  
 
Pay for Success contracting using social impact 
bonds offers governments a leadership tool to 
overcome each of these three barriers – lack of 
performance assessment, under-investment in 
prevention, and inability to collaborate 
effectively with service providers around 
improving systems.  By doing so, it has the 
potential to speed up progress in addressing 
challenging social problems. 
  
III. The Pay for Success model  
 
Pay for Success contracting using social impact 
bonds combines two tools—a performance 
contract and an operating loan.  
 
Performance contract. Under a performance 
contract, the government purchases social 
services aimed at a specific target population. 
Instead of paying for the quantity of services 
delivered, the government pays based on the 
outcomes that are achieved by the services -- 
e.g., the number of ex-offenders prevented from 
returning to prison, the number of unemployed 
individuals who succeed in finding stable 
employment, or the reduction in low birthweight 
births.  These outcomes are measured by an 
independent evaluator.  The parties to the 
contract agree to the target outcomes, the 
metrics that will be used to evaluate whether the 
outcomes are achieved, the method of 
evaluation, and a payment schedule. The 
government commits to pay for achieved 
outcomes— if the intervention fails to achieve 
the minimum target, the government does not 
pay.  Payments typically rise for performance 
that exceeds the minimum target, up to an 
agreed-upon maximum payment level.   
 
In most cases, performance is rigorously 
measured by comparing the outcomes of 
individuals referred to the service provider to the 
outcomes of a comparison or control group that 
is not offered the services – so the payment is 
based on the impact of the intervention.   
 
Operating loan/social impact bond (SIB) 
A social impact bond is not a “bond” but rather a 
loan from private funders. Most social service 
providers do not have the financial capacity to 
deliver services, wait several years for 
performance to be assessed, and only then 
receive repayment for the services that were 
delivered.  And most are not positioned to 
absorb the risk associated with a large portion of 
reimbursement being based on performance.   
To overcome these obstacles, PFS projects 
generally include an operating loan from 
private funders who provide upfront capital in 
exchange for the lion’s share of the government 
payments that become available if the 
performance targets are met. If the targeted level 
of outcomes is achieved, the loan is repaid with 
interest from the government’s performance 
payments. If the minimum outcomes are not 
achieved, investors can lose all of their principal.  
In many PFS projects, the government contracts 
with an intermediary organization that 
holds both the performance contract and the 
operating loan. The intermediary uses the 
operating funds raised from investors to contract 
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with one or more service providers to deliver the 
interventions necessary to meet the performance 
targets. Though some governments have chosen 
to include the service provider as a party to the 
PFS contract in addition to the intermediary, 
others have contracted with only an 
intermediary.  
 
If PFS contracts were simply a financing 
mechanism to allow governments to procure 
services today and use the generated budgetary 
savings to pay for the services in the future, they 
would be of limited value, since a government 
could simply borrow funds and pay directly for 
the services at interest rates generally lower than 
the expected rates of return paid to PFS 
investors.  Similarly, if SIBs were primarily a 
mechanism for the government to purchase 
insurance against program failure, they would be 
a dubious instrument since governments can 
spread risk over their entire tax base and 
shouldn’t be paying a premium to risk-adverse 
investors to take on risk. 
 
But PFS projects backed by social impact bonds 
are much more than a financing device. They are 
a way to overcome barriers to shifting spending 
toward preventative services.  They are a way to 
expand promising interventions, while 
rigorously assessing their effectiveness and 
protecting taxpayers against the risk that an 
ineffective program will continue to receive 
funding.  And most importantly, they are a way 
of binding government agencies and providers 
together in a multi-year data-driven effort to 
improve service delivery and thereby make 
progress on a difficult social problem. These PFS 
benefits are significant because none of them are 
easy to accomplish using standard public sector 
management practices. 
 
IV. The Experience with PFS in the U.S.  
 
The world’s first PFS project was launched in 
Peterborough, England in 2010.  It provided 
services designed to reduce recidivism for 
individuals being released from jail. The first 
three U.S. PFS projects were also criminal 
justice projects.  In August 2012, New York City 
launched a PFS project that provided cognitive 
behavioral therapy to juveniles incarcerated at 
Rikers Island; in December 2013, New York 
State launched a PFS project that is providing 
employment services to men released from state 
prison; and in January 2014, Massachusetts 
launched a project to provide education and 
employment skills to young men involved in the 
criminal justice system.  As of February 2017, 15 
PFS projects have been launched in the US, 9 of 
which received government-side technical 
assistance from the Harvard Kennedy School 
Government Performance Lab.  
 
In addition to the early criminal justice projects 
in Rikers Island, New York State, and 
Massachusetts, a fourth recidivism project in 
Salt Lake County (UT) was launched in late 
2016. It is no coincidence that many of the initial 
PFS projects were in criminal justice policy. The 
potential budgetary savings from reducing 
incarceration are large. There are outcomes 
measures -- employment rates and subsequent 
convictions and incarcerations – that capture 
most of what the interventions are trying to 
achieve.  The data necessary to measure these 
outcomes is already collected by the 
government. And most of the budgetary savings 
from reduced incarceration accrue to the same 
level of government that is funding the 
preventative investments.  
  
Five PFS projects – in Massachusetts, Denver 
(CO), Cuyahoga County (OH), Santa Clara 
County (CA), and Salt Lake County (UT) – are 
providing supportive housing to formerly 
homeless individuals or to families struggling to 
maintain stable housing. These projects aim to 
improve the well-being of formerly homeless 
individuals and to reduce the budgetary costs 
associated with homelessness – shelter and jail 
usage costs, emergency room and hospitalization 
related expenses, behavioral health costs, and 
foster care expenses. 
  
Four projects address early childhood. Two 
projects, in Utah and in Chicago, are expanding 
slots in pre-kindergarten programs, with the 
goal of improving student achievement and 
reducing special education costs. Projects in 
Michigan and South Carolina are expanding  
prenatal and early childhood care with the goal 
of improving child outcomes and reducing costs 
associated with low birthweight births and child 
maltreatment. 
 
One PFS project aims to improve child welfare 
practices.  A Connecticut PFS project is 
providing substance abuse treatment to parents 
in child-welfare-involved families with the goal 
of reducing out of home placements.  
 
The PFS model is also spreading beyond social 
services. In September 2016, The DC Water 
authority issued the US’s first environmental 
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impact bond to fund installation of green 
infrastructure intended to reduce stormwater 
and sewage runoff into polluted waterways.  
 
Table 1 at the end of this piece presents 
additional information about the 15 launched 
U.S. PFS projects.   
 
More than a dozen additional projects are under 
development across the country, including 
projects targeting substance use treatment, adult 
basic education, and troubled youth.  
 
As of February 2017, three of the U.S. projects – 
the New York City Rikers Island project, the 
Utah pre-K project, and the Chicago pre-K 
project – had reached the point at which 
outcomes were measured and payments 
determined.   
 
In May 2016, the first payment was earned for 
the Chicago PFS project, an expansion of high-
quality pre-K services. The payment earned was 
based on intermediate measures that included 
kindergarten readiness.  
 
In the Rikers Island project, 16 to 18-year-old 
youth who were offered cognitive behavioral 
therapy experienced 5 percent more days of 
incarceration than an earlier cohort of youth 
who were not offered this therapy.  Because the 
intervention did not achieve the target 10 
percent reduction in incarceration, no payments 
were made to investors and the program was 
discontinued. 
 
In the Utah pre-K project, a weak evaluation 
methodology generated controversy.  In this 
project, payments are being made for every pre-
K enrollee who does not require special 
education services each year from Kindergarten 
through sixth grade.  In 2015, an initial 
evaluation determined that only 1 of 110 at-risk 
children who received pre-K required special 
education, and $267,472 in success payments 
were made.  However, because there was no 
comparison group, it is impossible to know to 
what extent this outcome was an improvement 
over what would have happened without the 
program, and critics have challenged the 
project’s claims of success. 
Fortunately, nearly all of the other active U.S. 
PFS projects are using more rigorous evaluation 
methodologies, including seven that are basing 
payments on the results from randomized 
controlled trials. 
 
V.  Lessons from the Early PFS Projects 
 
The early U.S. PFS projects have demonstrated 
the model's potential to increase resources 
dedicated to tackling challenging social 
problems, while simultaneously generating 
evidence revealing which interventions work and 
minimizing the risk that ineffective programs 
continue to receive funding year after year. 
 
More importantly, the early projects have 
demonstrated the model's potential to improve 
the delivery systems for social services.  
 
In Massachusetts and Denver, Pay for Success 
projects around homelessness drove much 
needed restructuring in the way that supportive 
housing units were funded and assigned. Before 
the PFS projects, housing funding streams were 
walled off from the support services many 
chronically homeless individuals need, 
preventing the government from effectively 
housing these individuals. In Denver, the PFS 
project created a platform through which the 
local housing authorities, regional Medicaid 
managed care organization, City Finance 
Department, and State housing finance 
organization were able to combine resources in 
support of a project strategically targeting the 
highest need individuals. As a part of the project, 
the City became the catalyst in generating new 
models for how governments can better leverage 
existing resources in combination with new 
flexible funding, allowing homelessness 
organizations to provide comprehensive services 
to the most vulnerable individuals within the 
community. The PFS projects led the 
government to combine those funding streams 
and re-engineer the way in which housing was 
assigned to prioritize those individuals with the 
greatest need for coordinated services. 
 
The New York State prisoner re-entry PFS 
project provides another example of the type of 
lasting systems change that a PFS project can 
produce. During the project's planning phase, 
the State analyzed the size and historical rates of 
recidivism and employment for various 
populations in order to identify the appropriate 
target population. This process was informed by 
a 2012 study, which demonstrated that the 
intervention is most successful for high risk 
individuals who were recently released.  Using 
these analyses, the State then specified the 
criteria to identify the target population as they 
exit prison and to refer them to receive job 
placement and employment training services by 
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the provider, CEO. During the course of the four 
year enrollment period, the State, the provider, 
and other stakeholders held weekly meetings to 
talk about any challenges or opportunities for 
improvement on the ground. For example, as 
soon as the enrollment rate falls below the pre-
specified target enrollment rate, the parties 
brainstorm possible course corrections to get 
back on track. This active contract management 
approach is strikingly different from business as 
usual social service contracting, where 
governments sign a contract and process 
invoices for program slots that are filled with 
little attention to matching the right people to 
the right program and to performance.  
 
As a third example, the Connecticut Department 
of Children and Families redesigned the way 
that families with indications of substance use 
are evaluated and referred to the substance use 
and parenting service expanded under the 
department’s PFS project. This improvement in 
the referral process deploys department data 
and a consistent triage process to allow the 
department to identify high-risk families early in 
the investigation process and make services 
available to them.  
 
Despite the recent momentum, the PFS model is 
facing some significant challenges. Most projects 
continue to require two years or more and 
significant technical assistance to assemble. 
Many cost savings are split between levels of 
government, but it has been challenging to enlist 
the federal government as a partner payor with 
state and local governments on projects where a 
substantial share of the budgetary savings will 
accrue to Medicaid and other federal programs.  
Some legislation to facilitate a greater federal 
role in specific policy areas has passed but a 
more comprehensive approach is still pending. It 
has also become clear that there are relatively 
few intervention models with sufficient evidence 
bases to attract commercial financing at rates of 
return competitive with government’s usual cost 
of borrowing. Many projects still rely on a mix of 
philanthropic and commercial funds, and some 
recent projects have struggled to attract new 
philanthropically-minded investors to take the 
place of the pioneering philanthropies who 
financed the initial deals. 
 
In response to these challenges, the PFS field is 
starting to experiment with new models, such as 
projects in which 80 percent of costs are paid up 
front by the government and only 20 percent are 
reimbursed based on program impact.  The 
question is whether having 20 percent of 
payments at risk is sufficient to generate the 
same focused attention on improving results, 
without needing to raise as much capital from 
investors. 
 
In addition, PFS practices are starting to be 
incorporated into core government operations, 
even when no investors or performance-based 
payments are involved.  For example, the 
Government Performance Lab has helped 
several governments institute "active contract 
management" practices for their key social 
service contracts.  The governments and service 
providers meet regularly (typically monthly) to 
collaboratively review data and identify 
opportunities to improve results and re-engineer 
systems. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have witnessed enormous growth in the PFS 
field in a few short years, from our work on the 
very first state projects in New York and 
Massachusetts to our 2015 national competition 
for technical assistance that received thirty 
applications from state and local governments. It 
remains to be seen how far the "classic" PFS 
social impact bond model can expand.  What 
seems clear though is that the PFS approach of 
data-driven collaboration between government 
agencies and service providers is here to stay.  
 
 
 
The Government Performance Lab at the Harvard 
Kennedy School conducts research on how 
governments can improve the results they achieve for 
their citizens. An important part of this research 
model involves providing pro bono technical 
assistance to state and local governments. Through 
this hands-on involvement, the Government 
Performance Lab gains insights into the barriers that 
governments face and the solutions that can overcome 
these barriers. For more information about the 
Government Performance Lab, please visit our 
website: www.govlab.hks.harvard.edu. 
 
The Government Performance Lab is grateful for 
support from Bloomberg Philanthropies, the 
Corporation for National and Community Service 
Social Innovation Fund, the Dunham Fund, the Laura 
and John Arnold Foundation, the Pritzker Children’s 
Initiative, and the Rockefeller Foundation. 
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Table 1: Launched Social Impact Bonds Across the U.S. as of February 2017 
Jurisdiction Issue area # of individuals served 
Private & 
philanthropic 
$  
Project initiation 
date* 
Projects receiving GPL technical assistance 
New York 
Criminal justice: Recidivism reduction through life skills 
education, job coaching, and transitional employment 
2,000 individuals over 
5.5 years 
$13.5M 12/09/2013 
Massachusetts 
Juvenile justice: Intensive outreach, education and 
employment support, and life skills training to youth at 
high risk for juvenile justice involvement 
Up to 1,036 individuals 
over 7 years 
$19.6M 1/1/2014 
Chicago, IL 
Early education: Expansion of high quality pre-K program 
that engages both with children and their parents 
2,620 children over 4 
years 
$16.9M 10/7/2014 
Massachusetts 
Homelessness: Permanent supportive housing for 
chronically homeless individuals 
Up to 800 individuals 
over 6 years 
$3.5M 12/8/2014 
Denver, CO 
Permanent supportive housing and wraparound services 
for chronically homeless individuals 
At least 250 individuals $8.6M 2/16/2016 
South 
Carolina 
Home visitation program to improve maternal and 
prenatal health for expecting mothers and babies 
3,200 first-time 
mothers and their 
babies 
$17M 2/16/2016 
Connecticut 
Substance abuse and parenting services for families 
involved in the child welfare system 
500 families over 4.5 
years 
$11.2M 2/16/2016 
Michigan 
Early childhood/pre-natal care for low-income mothers 
and their children 
1700 mothers over 5 
years 
$7M 9/1/2016 
DC Water  
Green infrastructure installation to reduce storm water 
runoff in the Rock Creek sewershed 
 $25M 9/29/2016 
Projects without GPL technical assistance 
New York 
City, NY 
Juvenile justice 
4,000 individuals a 
year for 4 years 
$9.6M 8/2/2012 
Salt Lake 
County, UT 
Expansion of pre-K services Up to 3,500 children $7M 9/1/2013 
Cuyahoga 
County, OH 
Foster care + homelessness 
135 homeless parents 
with children over 12-15 
months 
$4M 1/1/2015 
Santa Clara 
County, CA 
Homelessness   
150-200 individuals 
over six years 
$6.9M 8/14/2015 
Salt Lake 
County, UT 
Homelessness 
315 individuals over six 
years 
$4.4M 12/16/2016 
Salt Lake 
County, UT 
Recidivism 
225 individuals over six 
years 
$4.6M 12/16/2016 
*Project initiation date: Date of executed contract, service launch, or official announcement of either executed contract or project launch. 
